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It’s worse in the summer, so many more pairs of eyes. They never think we mind, 
but we do. I mind particularly being stared at.
Crystal Palace Iguanodon (Coates 15)
When Stephen Greenblatt used the terms ‘resonance’ and ‘wonder’ to describe the museum 
experience, he was differentiating between the feeling generated from an object in itself, 
without the help of labels, catalogues, or prior knowledge, and the understanding that comes 
from placing the object within its historic or cultural context (Greenblatt 1990). Thus, ‘wonder’ 
is created by ‘the artwork’s capacity to generate in the spectator surprise, delight, admiration, 
and intimations of genius’ (32). The feeling is explicitly dependent on not knowing: it is ‘the 
movement of the man who does not know on his way to finding out’ (34). Resonance, in contrast, 
is the power of the object displayed to reach out beyond its formal boundaries 
to a larger world, to evoke in the viewer the complex, dynamic cultural forces 
from which it has emerged and for which—as metaphor or, more simply, as 
metonymy—it may be taken by a viewer to stand (19). 
Greenblatt compared ‘resonance’ to the literary-critical practice of new historicism; to achieve 
resonance, one requires context about the culture and artist that produced the work. 
However, in the nineteenth century, it was widely claimed that the museum object in 
itself could evoke both wonder and resonance. For the first half of the century, objects in the 
British Museum were largely unlabeled, uncatalogued, and unexplained. The official ‘synopsis’ 
of the museum – which had to be purchased (for six shillings in the 1830s, or roughly the 
equivalent of twenty-five pounds in today’s currency) – recorded information about the donor of 
an object, but not its origin, creator, or cultural significance. Despite this, or perhaps because of 
it, the idea that an object could evoke a ‘larger world’ without the aid of paratext was current in 
discussions of the pedagogical function of the museum. Thus, the Liverpool Mercury described 
the museum as ‘a great educator’, in which there was no need for explanations of the objects: 
Though no learned lecturer appears in formal phrase to the ear, the objects 
themselves do so through the eye; and the materials for thought which present 
themselves in such varied forms come forth from time to time in new and interesting 
shapes, after undergoing fusion in the crucible of the mind (March 15, 1853) 
The idea of the ‘object lesson’, which required no teachers or formal schooling, stemmed from 
a belief in the universal power to ‘see through’ a museum object to ‘a realm of significance 
which cannot itself be seen’ (Bennett 1994: 35). While twentieth-century critics like Bourdieu 
and Darbel (1991) acknowledge that the aesthetic gaze must be learned, in the nineteenth 
century it was seen in Kantian terms as both transcendent and universal. In the Critique of 
Judgment (1790), Kant had insisted that the arbiter of taste ‘judges not merely for himself, but 
for everyone, and speaks of beauty as if it were a property of things’ (Kant and Bernard 1892: 
58). Thus, beauty is embedded in the thing itself and is perceptible to everyone who views 
it. While Kant focused on beauty, discussions of the nineteenth-century museum extended 
the qualities that could be universally perceived in an object to include all that Greenblatt’s 
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‘resonance’ encompasses. Thus, one newspaper insisted that a museum visitor could grasp 
‘an almost complete picture of the religious, civil, and warlike life of the Assyrian kings’ merely 
from viewing the artefacts discovered in the ruins of Nineveh (Daily News, January 13, 1848). 
The whole truth of the civilization is embedded in each fragmentary object, each of the ‘earrings, 
necklaces, bracelets, arms, thrones, furniture, vases, and the carriages which were in use 
at the court of Nineveh’ (Daily News, January 13, 1848). In this way, the aesthetic gaze was 
thought to allow even the casual viewer to complete a part-to-whole conversion in a process 
that we will call ‘imaginative reconstruction’, in which the fragmentary or uncontextualized 
part is reassembled into an ideal and accurate whole. In what follows, we discuss imaginative 
reconstruction and absolute truth with especial regard to the use of models in museum displays, 
using reconstructions of natural history (and in particular of dinosaurs) as a lens through which 
to scrutinise the nineteenth-century history of this idea and its textual resonances today. 
Nineteenth-century belief in imaginative reconstruction is evident throughout the essays of 
the art critic Walter Pater, as in ‘The Myth of Demeter and Persephone’ (first published in 1876): 
what we actually possess is some actual fragments of poetry, some actual 
fragments of sculpture; and with a curiosity, justified by the direct aesthetic beauty 
of these fragments, we feel our way backwards to the engaging picture of the 
poet-people, with which the ingenuity of modern theory has filled the void in our 
knowledge. (Pater 1895: 113)
Though Pater doesn’t say how we are to ‘feel our way backwards’, the language of the passage 
links imaginative reconstruction with objective fact: it is ‘modern theory’, ‘justified’ by ‘direct’ 
empirical observation. The repetition of ‘actual’ ties the imaginative ‘picture’ to material reality. 
Though invisible, the absolute truth of the past is as real as the fragmentary object in front of 
the viewer. As Csikszentmihalyi and Robinson (1990) explain, 
approaches to aesthetics based on the concept of the Platonic ideal stressed the 
belief that art represents not the limited particularities of the world of appearances 
but the underlying, eternal forms behind them…Thus the aesthetic experience 
was seen as the satisfaction of an intellectual need to grasp that which is really 
real (11). 
Donald Preziosi notes that the museum encounter not only relies on ‘the independent existence 
and agency of what its objects are taken as signifying’ (Preziosi 2012: 83), it manufactures 
this belief through the apparently natural relationship between the object and the signified—a 
naturalness that we suggest is verified by the choice to exclude labels or other explanatory 
material from the museum. 
Nineteenth-century museums drew a distinction between ‘indexical’ displays, those 
which were ‘a material trace of the past’, like Pater’s ‘actual fragments’, and ‘iconic’ displays, 
which offered a mere likeness, such as the historical paintings routinely displayed in the 
museum (Rieppel 2012: 464). Rieppel notes that ‘curators worried that icons were vulnerable 
to distortion by the subjective and perhaps even erroneous beliefs of whoever had fashioned 
them’ (464). Like icons, labels are a form of human intervention, and could be subject to error 
or bias. In this way, it was feared that the inclusion of text would destabilize the truth-claims 
made in the museum. In contrast, the unexplained object was seen to maintain the authority 
of the indexical: a material trace of the past, the ‘actual fragments’, here in the present. 
As the museum privileged objects over text, so too did those who lauded the muse-
um as a potential substitute for more traditional forms of education. Thus, the MP 
Joseph Hume suggested that the museum could replace literacy itself: 
The teaching to read and to write was a most beneficial thing, but the throwing 
open to the public of such places as the British Museum and the National Gallery, 
on a day when the great mass of the public could alone avail itself of the benefit, 
would operate as a still more improving and elevating kind of education (Daily 
News, August 15 1846). 
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The London Standard agreed, asserting that 
it must be obvious to everyone, that a glance at the treasure of antiquities and 
natural history, collected at some much cost, could not fail to do more in awakening 
the mind of a child (aye, of a child of no more than five or six years old) to the 
important outline truths of history and philosophy than a year’s book-reading 
(June 07, 1838). 
In this understanding of direct engagement, not only does the object require no 
textual explanation, it actually supplants text. 
The fantasy of knowledge that could be gained from a mere ‘glance’ reached its heights in the 
popular understanding of the feats of identification and reconstruction performed by naturalists 
of the period, most famously Georges Cuvier and Richard Owen. Owen gained renown in the 
1840s for his identification of the Dinornis, or moa, from a single fragment of a bone. It was 
reported that: 
a sailor presented at the British Museum a huge marrowbone, which he desired to 
sell, and which he had brought from New Zealand. The officers of that institution 
not usually dealing in that class of marine stores, referred him to the College of 
Surgeons, where, they said, he would find a gentleman—one Professor Owen—
who had a remarkable predilection for old bones. Accordingly, the sailor took 
his treasure to the professor, who, finding it unlike any bone even he had any 
knowledge of, sent the man away rejoicing with a full pocket—rejoicing himself 
in the acquisition of a new subject for scientific inquiry  (July 20, 1852)
The popular press portrayed the identification of the moa as work which required knowledge 
only of a single principle of correlation, derived from Cuvier, which suggested that a mere 
fragment of an animal, such as a single tooth, could reveal the makeup of the whole creature 
(see Dawson 2016). The language used to describe Owen’s feat of induction aligned this 
principle of correlation with imaginative reconstruction as a form of instantaneous access to 
truth; popular accounts claimed that Owen identified the moa at ‘first inspection’ (Freeman’s 
Journal, August 23, 1843), from ‘merely seeing the portion of bone’ (The Morning Post, August 
23, 1843). Owen encouraged this myth, referring to his deduction as ‘prevision of an unseen 
part’ (Dawson 2016: 124), suggesting a kind of supernatural second sight that allows the 
unseen to become visible. 
Though this language appears to uphold the power of the aesthetic gaze and the truth 
of imaginative reconstruction, the ‘real story’ of the moa undermines the museum’s insistence 
that objects could speak for themselves. The newspaper account above insisted that Owen 
had no prior knowledge on which to base his induction—’finding it unlike any bone even he 
had any knowledge of’—and his friend William Broderip corroborated this claim, stating that 
Owen was ‘a man in the dark with the exception of the glimmering that he could collect from 
that fragment’ (quoted in Dawson 2012). However, in actuality, Owen’s assessment that 
the bone fragment came from a large, flightless, now-extinct bird was based on extensive 
comparison with and knowledge of extant species, as Owen reported to the members of the 
British Association for the Advancement of Science (The Morning Post, August 23, 1843). 
The museum’s insistence on the power of the aesthetic gaze to penetrate to the truth of the 
object serves to elide the labour and education required to place an object into its appropriate 
context, and falsely suggests that everyone should be able to access truth without context, 
paratext, or prior knowledge. The truth of Owen’s expertise and labour undermines the central 
premise of the museum’s object lessons.
Further destabilizing the truth of the object is the story that Dawson describes in Show 
Me the Bone: that the man who sold Owen the fragment of bone had already identified it as 
belonging to a large, extinct bird (97). The sailor ascribed his successful identification of the 
Dinornis to his knowledge of local New Zealand folklore and legends, which were populated 
with giant birds. It is in narrative, then, that the story of the moa is found—whether in the form 
of folklore or the personal and journalistic accounts which spun the legend of Owen’s prophetic 
gaze—narratives which speak for, and over, the actual material object. 
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The layers of fiction that underpin the myth of the moa reveal that there is no one 
truth to be found in the museum. The instability of the ‘story’ of the moa is apparent in the 
passing reference to Owen that appears in William Makepeace Thackeray’s 1854 novel The 
Newcomes: Memoirs of a Most Respectable Family, in which he compares the work of the 
novelist to that of natural historians: 
As Professor Owen or Professor Agassiz takes a fragment of a bone, and builds 
an enormous forgotten monster out of it, wallowing in primaeval quagmires, 
tearing down leaves and branches of plants that flourished thousands of years 
ago, and perhaps may be coal by this time—so the novelist puts this and that 
together (Thackeray 1854: 81). 
In this metaphor, ‘the feelings in a young lady’s mind’ are analogous to ‘the forgotten monster 
of the past’: they are both plausible fictions. If the museum is a substitute for text, it is only 
because it, too, is a constructed narrative, fiction rather than reality. The narrator insists that his 
novel is ‘not less authentic’ than the work of Owen or Agassiz—by extension, then, Owen and 
Agassiz’s work is no more authentic than Thackeray’s fiction. In this way, Arthur Pendennis, 
the novel’s narrator, guards against accusations that his tale is grounded in speculation by 
pointing out how readily the public accepts this kind of imaginative work within the sciences. 
Rieppel notes that reconstructions of extinct species, like the moa, present a unique 
problem to museums because they ‘rel[y] on a great deal of contested knowledge about the 
anatomy, life history, and behavior of strange and long-extinct animals to which curators had 
no direct observational access’ (Rieppel 2012: 461). However, this is equally true of much of 
the historical knowledge presented in the British Museum. The public was reminded of the 
speculative nature of museum ‘facts’ time and again in the nineteenth century—when the 
translation of hieroglyphs enabled by the Rosetta Stone rewrote much of ancient Egyptian 
history, or when the painting of ancient statues seemed to undermine the ideal purity of classical 
marbles. Each of these incidents served to underscore the fictionality of the fixed and universal 
truth of the museum object.
The museum responded to the destabilization of its authority by increasingly displaying 
restorations alongside real artefacts. These models suggest that the museum understood the 
failure of fragments to speak for themselves; they can be seen as an attempt to literalize the 
metonymic function of imaginative reconstruction by manifesting the ideal, invisible whole in 
a visible and material form. Though they are iconic rather than indexical, restorations were 
deemed preferable to labels because they maintain the fantasy on which the status of the 
museum as a source of objective empirical truth was based: direct engagement with the 
object, unmediated by text. Restorations fix the meaning of the fragmentary artefact while 
disguising the acts of interpretation and imagination that underpin their creation. Like Pater’s 
‘actual fragments’ before them, the materiality of the restoration is mobilized in support of the 
apparent reality of the museum exhibition. 
Thus, Waterhouse Hawkins, the creator of the Crystal Palace dinosaurs, suggested 
that his models simply made visible the invisible truth of Owen’s imaginative reconstructions. 
First, ‘the mighty genius of Professor Owen placed the teeth and head before us, with such 
indisputable characters as united them to the foot-marks, and thus, by induction, placed the 
whole animal before us’. Yet, for ‘the public at large’, the fragments in the British Museum ‘are 
literally only dry bones or oddly-shaped stones to the majority who see them’ (a description 
which also misrepresents the nature of the fossil object, as discussed below). It took the ‘great 
enterprise and resources of the Crystal Palace Company’ to 
revivify the ancient world, to call up from the abyss of time and from the depths 
of the earth those vast forms and gigantic beasts which the Almighty Creator 
designed with fitness to inhabit and precede us in this part of the earth called 
Great Britain (May 18, 1854).
Waterhouse Hawkins speaks of his models as the embodiment of the aesthetic gaze, providing 
direct access to the Absolute Truth of the past (see also Marshall 2007: 293). To ‘restore’, of 
course, merely means to return to a previous condition, and thus suggests that nothing new, 
speculative, or imaginative has been allowed to enter the equation.   
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Materiality seemed to verify the reality of these models, but it also rendered them dangerous 
to the truth claims on which the status of the museum and the Crystal Palace were so reliant. 
While Owen could, for instance, quietly change his predictions about the exact size or shape 
of the Dinornis (his final estimate of the bird’s size was far smaller than his first assertion), 
the Crystal Palace dinosaurs were, as James Secord points out, quite literally set in stone 
(Secord 2004: 146). Each interpretation of the ‘reality’ of the past has the potential to be proven 
wrong, thus further destabilizing the fantasy of direct access to universal truth in the museum 
encounter. This point is vividly dramatized by Ann Coates’s 1970 children’s novella Dinosaurs 
Don’t Die, in which one of the Crystal Palace statues, brought to life by an unspecified magic, 
wrestles with its inadequacy as a true representation of prehistoric life. 
‘What really bothers me’, the Standing Iguanodon says, ‘is being built all wrong. […] For 
instance, you see this horn on the end of my nose? Well, it should be my thumb. My thumb, 
if you please! How could anyone be so stupid!’ (Coates 1970: 17). The reference is to one of 
the signal errors in the Crystal Park models—a mistake which generally forms a centerpiece to 
the popular assumption that they are ‘grossly dated’ (Switek 2013: 43). Upset at the laughing 
Fig 1. Illustration from Ann Coates’s ‘Dinosaurs Don’t Die’ (1970)
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stock he has become, the Iguanodon—eventually named Rock by his human child companion 
Daniel—explicitly frames his frustration in terms of the ways in which he fails to stand in for 
his ‘Ancestors’, a word never deployed in Coates’s text without the capital A.
Personally, most of the time I just stand here on the island wishing I was made 
of flesh and blood instead of iron and brick. My Ancestors […] must have been 
terrific fellows (Coates 1970: 17).
This short speech is revealing as regards Rock’s ontological situation: he is certainly a 
model—lacking ‘flesh and blood’ even when magically brought to life—and yet the relationship 
envisaged with the genuine living creatures of the Mesozoic is one of descent, not of imitation. 
As Daniel tells Rock more about the history of the Crystal Palace dinosaurs, the text portrays 
the slippery relationship between object and signified: at one point, Rock learns about the 
dinner party famously held inside him on New Year’s Eve 1853 (‘How dare they hold a dinner 
party inside me when they’d made me all wrong’, 33), at another he tries an apple in order 
to learn about the diet of the actual living creatures among which he implicitly counts himself 
(‘Your Ancestors ate vegetable things, and plants and leaves, not meat’, 28). When Rock asks 
‘And how did we get our name, do you know, by any chance?’, the plural could refer both to 
the presence of the second Crystal Palace Iguanodon—silent in the text, beside Rock on the 
ground in real life—or to the fact that two kinds of different things, one mortar and one bone, 
have both been given the name Iguanodon (25). Rock’s question can mean both ‘how did we 
statues come to be named after such dissimilar, living animals?’ and ‘how did the group of 
living animals, of which I am a member, come to be named?’. 
‘I am fated never to know what I might have looked like’, Rock declares (34). The conditional 
here potentially reaches in several different directions: might, had I been made accurately; 
might, had I been flesh and blood; might, had I myself been one of the Ancestors. Rock’s 
disjunction could be formal, material, temporal, or all three. At the book’s climax, Daniel takes 
Rock to the dinosaur hall of the Natural History Museum in South Kensington— ‘A palace, by 
the look of it’—to see the skeletons of some real Iguanodons (59). Rock is greatly moved by 
coming face to face with the fossilized tokens of the authentic Mesozoic past, in part because 
of their dissimilarity from him: ‘Do you see how upright they are’, he asks, ‘looking as if they 
might move off at any minute?’ (65). But this sense of dynamism is an illusion: unlike him, the 
skeletons in John V. Lord’s illustration of this moment (Fig. 1) are completely inert, ignored 
by the magic which lurks in the Crystal Palace and lacking the soft tissue which would have 
been necessary for any ‘moving off’ in life. Their apparent vitality is a quality of the ‘upright’ 
way they have been posed by the museum’s curators, a way which, we know fifty years 
Fig 2. Contemporary depiction of Iguanodon
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after the publication of Coates’s book, also fails to be true to the original (Iguanodons, it is 
currently thought, would have carried their tails parallel to the ground, a stance more like 
that shown in Fig. 2, a 2018 reconstruction employing the latest scientific information). Rock 
fails to understand that he still hasn’t encountered the true originals, that what he sees is a 
museum text as vulnerable to upward revisions in scientific understanding as he himself has 
proven to be. Coates herself hints at an awareness of this—albeit obliquely—by choosing not 
to animate the museum objects: the same textual gesture which creates the Ancestors as 
pristine, authentic representations necessarily denudes them of an ability (or need) to speak 
with anything other than their forms, their essence, their object-ness. The Crystal Palace 
dinosaur, though, now unyoked from pure scientific truth, requires magical animation, dialogue, 
and narration in order to be situated. 
Fig 3. Illustration from Ann Coates’s ‘Dinosaurs Don’t Die’ (1970)
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Rather than sneaking back out of the museum with Daniel, Rock opts to spend the night 
in South Kensington with the Ancestors, becoming—until the confused authorities return him 
to Sydenham the next morning—a real museum object at last. In another of Lord’s glorious 
illustrations, Rock is pictured next to the Iguanodons, gazing at the same horizon (and not, 
tellingly, at the Ancestors it has come to see) whilst standing in his original Crystal Palace 
stance. Thus contextualized, Rock becomes a seamless part of the displayed evolution of the 
dinosaur image (Fig. 3). Judging by the shape of the gallery, the care Coates appears to have 
taken with her locations, and the publication date of the book, the sauropod behind Rock in this 
image is almost certainly Dippy, the iconic Diplodocus skeleton which would be moved to the 
front hallway of the museum in 1979 and remain there until 2017. Dippy is cast from a skeleton 
in Pittsburgh—no part of him was ever part of a living animal (for a full account of his history, 
see Nieuwland 2019). Meanwhile, since fossilization is a process which replaces bone with 
stone (see Thomson 2005: 59-67), the claim of the ‘real’ Iguanodon remains to authenticity is 
also far from straightforward. Materially, all three groups—statues, cast, and skeletons—have 
more in common than might at first be supposed: they are all solid, they are all unthinkable 
without nature, and they are all unthinkable without human interference and creativity.
They are also all inscrutable. The epiphany Rock has when faced with his Ancestors is a silent 
one, although it is certainly enough for him and requires, again, no labels (‘I’m overjoyed. He 
is magnificent. I am very proud’, Coates 1970: 63). However, it’s not only the Ancestors who 
fail to speak their own histories: Rock is basically ignorant of the history (natural and human) 
of Iguanodon until Daniel arrives, early in the text, to educate him. It is important for our 
argument here that Daniel cannot do this offhandedly, despite his daily visits to the dinosaur 
park (which he lives opposite). Instead, he leaves Rock when he discovers the statue’s thirst 
for knowledge and returns the next night with ‘some small books’ (25) and ‘pictures of your 
Ancestors’ (19). These textual apparatuses, and not the museum exhibit in South Kensington, 
are what educate the unlabeled object that is the Standing Iguanodon: ‘Look, this is what you 
would have looked like if they’d made you correctly’ (25). Only with books, pictures, and a 
guide, can the model begin to understand what he stands in for.
Inert though they are in real life, the textual surroundings of Waterhouse Hawkins’s 
models continue to alter. Under the care of the Friends of Crystal Palace Dinosaurs (FCPD, 
est. 2013), recent renovations have adjusted the tone (and therefore the models themselves) 
in the direction of science education:
Some of the statues are wildly inaccurate compared with modern interpretations. 
[…] However, research by historians shows clearly that experts in the 1850s had 
different interpretations, and these differences in view are reflected in the statues 
on display. The story of these evolving interpretations demonstrates how scientific 
ideas evolve when new evidence and ideas comes to light.1
Mitigated by texts like this, the Crystal Palace dinosaurs are gently being resituated away 
from Victorian obsolescence, understood instead in terms of their role in local history and 
their value as an object lesson in the scientific method. A different way of putting this would 
be to say that they have been transubstantiated from objects of natural history to objects of 
human history, a transubstantiation which relies on the tacit acknowledgement that human 
history was really present all along. Signage at the site itself is a crucial part of this process, 
with all-new interpretation replacing a previous generation of material in late 2016; the original 
idea that the models could or should speak for themselves has long since been abandoned. 
Coates’s book, as well as displaying the textual and material imbroglio which constitutes the 
modern Iguanodon, is itself a part of this slow reworking. Its fantastical plotline only thinly veils 
its pedagogical aims, but Coates also sets an important precedent by establishing Rock as a 
character loveable because of, and not in spite of, his outdated bulkiness. The FCPD is still 
engaged in this characterizing work: a twitter vote2 was held to name the two Iguanodons in 
Sheju Adiyatiparambil-John and Judy Skidmore’s recent picture-book The Mysterious Dinosaurs 
of Crystal Palace (2019), a portion of the proceeds from which will go towards conservation 
efforts at the site (the winning names were Paxton and Victoria).3  
This whole discussion goes some way towards shedding light on Coates’s title, 
Dinosaurs Don’t Die, a phrase that doesn’t appear in the body of her text and seems, initially, 
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a little incongruous. Rock is called a dinosaur at points in the text, but it is also clear that 
he remains an animated statue, not a flesh-and-blood creature, and the fact that he barely 
resembles the Ancestors he so admires is, in many ways, the point of the book. The answer 
to this incongruity, of course, it that it is both/and not either/or. It is precisely because of the 
mutability of the dinosaur as a social object—its ability to inhabit two apparently contradictory 
states simultaneously—that Rock can be both an innocent student of the Mesozoic past and an 
instructive product of it. This mutability is also exercised by the statues themselves in real life; 
it is granted, in part, by the textual constitution of the museum object. Revising labels (doing 
away with old ones when new information is discovered) is essential for the pedagogical aims 
of the museum, but can also be seen as yet another strategy to obscure the instability of truth 
in the museum, and to hide the speculative nature of much of the knowledge displayed. While 
we suggested that restorations are ‘dangerous’ because they reveal the speculation which 
was always inherent in the museum display, they are also valuable because they cannot be 
so easily rewritten or swept under the rug. Indeed, there are often laws in place specifically 
to prevent this (the Crystal Palace models are categorized as Grade I listed buildings in order 
to ensure their protection).
The images discussed so far are, of course, only a few of the many different ways Iguanodon has 
been portrayed since first being disinterred in 1822. Artistic renderings have been consistently 
updated to reflect the newest discoveries—for example, the correct location of its famous 
spike—from George Scharf’s 1833 restoration, through Alice Woodward’s more upright 1895 
image, to the iconic postwar work of Zdeněk Burian and beyond. These palaeoartists, though, 
did not neutrally depict incremental improvements in scientific understanding. Like any other 
artists, they are also sensitive to the stylistic mores of the historical moment (Witton 2018: 23 
and passim). It is surprisingly easy, we know from the workshops we have run, to guess the 
date of a work of dinosaur art to within a couple of decades; it is art, and not the dinosaur, that 
one needs a sense of in order to do well at this challenge. Wanting to celebrate this fact, to 
remind museum visitors that the history of dinosaurs is a history of art as well as a history of 
science, we collaborated in 2018 with the palaeontologist Richard Butler to produce a small 
exhibition called ‘Drawing Out the Dinosaurs’ at the Lapworth Museum of Geology in Birmingham, 
UK (at the time of writing, the exhibition is about to tour other locations in the region). Part 
of the exhibition was a ‘gallery wall’ displaying, chronologically, some moments in the artistic 
development of three animals: Diplodocus on the top row, Iguanodon on the middle row, and 
Megalosaurus along the bottom (Fig. 4). Our purpose in framing and hanging the pictures this 
way was twofold: to treat palaeontological restorations like the artworks they undoubtedly are 
(palaeoart tends to be overlooked by art historians—see Lescaze 2017: 267 and ff.), and to 
expose a science museum’s visitors to the fact that art had been in there all along. 
Fig 4. Photo of ‘Drawing out the Dinosaurs’ Exhibition
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The strongest challenge to the smooth teleology, the incremental perfection of the 
dinosaur image hinted at by the Crystal Palace signage, is that the outmoded dinosaurs don’t 
cease to exist—in fact, as the FCPD know better than most, they are carefully conserved 
by groups of volunteers. Scharf, Woodward, and Burian are all still there, as objects and in 
consciousness, just as Rembrandt and Hokusai are still there—as a result of the labour of texts 
and people. Statues can continue to stand, images can continue to circulate, and obsolete 
ideas can continue to influence the creation of new interpretations (see Witton et al. 2014: 
7). More than this: inaccurate images can endure in the individual consciousness—perhaps 
especially if they reach it during a certain period in childhood—subtly influencing the sense of 
what a dinosaur is, or should be. These images belie the idea that a stable, scientific evolution 
is the only force governing the altered forms of dinosaurs in popular culture. They can be 
banished by science, which rightly works towards improving our comprehension of the real 
animals which walked around Mesozoic Earth, but no human has ever seen one of these 
animals, and no human ever will, unmitigated by human processes: excavation, preparation, 
restoration. Seeing this requires us to see that ‘imaginative reconstruction’ has always involved 
creative labor rather than, as was doctrine in the nineteenth century (and since), the perfect 
replication of a pre-existing Truth. What is more, older interpretations are not simply dismissed 
from the public imagination, but can lurk like Rock on his island, offering commentary on their 
replacements. Dinosaurs don’t die.
‘What’s your dinosaur?’ We have found it useful to begin workshops on art in natural 
history museums by asking this question. The underlying conceit is that everyone, upon hearing 
the word ‘dinosaur’, pictures something slightly different. Some find that they imagine a carnivore, 
for example, and some pick a plant-eater: ‘dinosaur’ is an enormous group encompassing 
millions of years of evolution, so even if it were possible to restrict one’s subconscious to 
objective, scientific reality there is still staggering diversity to choose from. We find, though, 
that people also differ in how they picture their dinosaur: is it a Disney cartoon, a Harryhausen 
puppet, a skeleton from a museum, a painting by James Gurney? Is it moving or static? Is it a 
human artefact (one participant pictured the Sinclair Oil logo, famously a green Brontosaurus) 
or ‘in the wild’? Can you tell what influences your ‘default’ conception of a dinosaur? Is it from 
a museum space at all? If it is, how much of it comes from science and how much from art? 
Where does the culpability of the fossil end and that of the reconstruction begin? Is it possible, 
ultimately, to separate them? 
Despite the best efforts of museums to present authentic, objective truth to their visitors, 
the lines between the indexical and iconic, the artefact and the model, and even fact and fiction 
inevitably blur in collective understandings of the distant past. The claim that a material artefact 
could conjure up authentic truth of the past and the reality that imagination and speculation 
are inseparable from this ‘truth’ are exemplified in a final brief example drawn from the life and 
work of the bestselling Victorian novelist H. Rider Haggard. 
In his large house in the Norfolk village of Ditchingham, Haggard had amassed ‘a 
collection of Egyptian and other artefacts, substantial enough to be given scholarly catalogue 
and assessment in the Journal of Egyptian Archaeology’ (Luckhurst 2012: 188). These objects 
– including ‘Arabian shields’, ‘Egyptian bows and throwing-sticks’, ‘ostrich eggs’, and a lamp 
‘made of the Royal red wood of Zululand’ – were partly gathered as a result of Haggard’s 
eventful life (How 4). They were also, though, as Roger Luckhurst has written, crucial elements 
in his famously intense periods of composition: ‘[f]or such a fantastical writer, his imagination 
was often utterly material, starting out with a literal handling of objects’ (Luckhurst 2012: 203). 
The pharaonic ring crucial to the plot of She (1886-1887), for example, was real – one of a 
pair presented to Haggard in the year he wrote the novel (194). From this we can surmise 
that Haggard both ascribed to the resonance of the material object, and understood that this 
resonance was grounded in the imaginative, the creative, and the outright fictional. Thus, also 
in his collection, hanging ‘over the mantlepiece’, was the ‘original sherd’, a work of pottery 
fabricated by Haggard which, in the story, contains the information that sends Leo and Holly 
on their adventure to the lost tombs of Kôr (How 14). In these two objects we see, perhaps, 
a microcosm of the exchange between imaginative reconstruction and absolute truth: the 
ring was a means by which Haggard ‘imagined himself into ancient […] worlds by processes 
of intense empathic projection, a form of feeling into that for many of his contemporaries did 
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indeed border on the supernatural, so “authentic” did his fiction feel’ (Luckhurst 2012: 193, 
original emphases). This authenticity, though, is also dependent upon on the existence of 
the sherd, a forgery which, Haggard contentedly declared, had nearly fooled the president 
of the Egyptian Exploration Fund (Malley 1997: 280). Here we see the true complexity of the 
relationship between Greenblatt’s resonance and wonder as constituted by the culture of 
nineteenth-century collecting – knowing and not knowing are both equally at play in experiencing 
these unlabeled objects. The ring becomes fiction once applied to the hand of Leo Vincey; the 
sherd becomes fact once situated in the context of Haggard’s collection. With both Haggard 
explores the past, with both he invents it. 
Today, the sherd is part of the collection at the Norwich Castle Museum and Art Gallery 
(NWHCM 1917.68.7.1). What truth are the people who come to see it there in search of? How 
will the museum’s labels, and their own imaginations, help them to find it?
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Notes
1 ‘What are the “Crystal Palace Dinosaurs”?’, Friends of the Crystal Palace Dinosaurs (n.d.). 
https://cpdinosaurs.org/visit/what-are-crystal-palace-dinosaurs/, accessed 11 April 2019.
2 Judy Skidmore, ‘Last Chance!...’, Twitter (12:09am 12 April 2019). https://twitter.com/
judystick/status/1116599106464411648, accessed 14 June 2019.
3 ‘The Mysterious Dinosaurs of Crystal Palace’, Parakeet Books (n.d.). https://www.
parakeetbooks.com/our-new-book/the-mysterious-dinosaurs-of-crystal-palace/, accessed 
12 April 2019.
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